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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
GUARDIANSHIP OF FLORENCE 
S. VALENTINE, ALLEGED 
INCOMPETENT. 
Case No. 8415 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts and issues in this appeal can best be ap-
preciated by the court after a statement as to the identity 
and interest of the respective parties and the issues be-
fore the court. 
A. DRAMATIS PERSONAE 
1. Florence S. Valentine 
Florence S. Valentine is the widow of J. Howard 
Valentine, founder and promoter of Western States Re-
fining Company, who died in November, 1952. She and 
her children inherited from him in excess of 380,000 
shares of the stock in that company. In 1953, suit was 
commenced against her individually and as executrix of 
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the estate of J. Howard Valentine, deceased, and a~ 
guardian of her then minor children, and Associated 
Dealers, a Valentine-controlled corporation, to cancel 
certain of the shares of stock in Western States Refining 
Company which they had received by gift or inheritance 
from J. Howard Valentine, on the basis that the shares 
had been illegally issued to ~tfr. Valentine, and for a 
money judgment for sums alleged to have been wrong-
fully received by ~Ir. and Mrs. Valentine from the cor-
poration and for the unpaid portion of water in other 
shares of Western States stock issued to them. This 
action is No. 98754, in the Third Judicial District Court. 
In February, 1954, Mrs. Valentine employed Irwin 
Arnovitz to represent her in all her capacities in that 
litigation. 
2. Irwin Arnovitz 
Irwin Arnovitz is a member of the Bar of this court 
and is the Petitioner who is seeking in these proceedings 
to have his former client declared incompetent and to 
have a guardian appointed for her personal estate. He 
was employed by Mrs. Valentine in February, 1954, to 
represent her in the suit then pending in the Third 
Judicial District Court as K o. 98754. Thi~ case was 
tried over an extended period in April, 1954, and at 
the conclusion of the trial, Judge Jeppson entered tenta-
tive findings in favor of the corporation and against Mr. 
Arnovitz' clients. After considerable delay, due primarily 
to Mr. Arnovitz' absence in Europe, a final judgment 
was entered against ~Irs. Y alentine in all her capacities 
in January, 1955, for cancellation of 73,311 shares of 
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Western States Refining Company stock received by her 
and her children from the late J. H. Valentine, and a 
money judgment of approximately $103,000 for which a 
lien was impressed against an additional 136,000 shares 
of Western States Refining Company stock on the find-
ing that said shares had not been fully paid for by Mr. 
Valentine. Apparently dissatisfied with Mr. Arnovitz' 
handling of her case, Mrs. Valentine discharged him in 
early March, 1955. When he appeared without authority 
in the Eliason case, (which will be mentioned below) she 
discharged him a second time on May 3, 1955. Shortly 
after that incident, Mr. Arnovitz filed the petition which 
is before this court to have Mrs. Valentine declared in-
competent. 
3. Sid H. Eliason 
Sid H. Eliason is a Salt Lake businessman and is 
represented in these proceedings by the author of this 
brief. In November 1953, a Mr. D. H. Linney purchased 
an option from Mrs. Valentine to acquire 300,000 shares 
of vV estern States Refining Company stock from her 
and a coporation known as "Associated Dealers", which 
she controlled, for One Dollar per share. In 1954 Mr. 
Eliason becmne financially interested in the Refining 
Company and among other things, purchased an assign-
ment of the above referred to option from Mr. Linney. 
Mrs. Valentine refused to perform the option and Eliason 
brought suit against her and Associated Dealers for 
specific performance. This is case No. 101780 in the 
Third Judicial District Court. 
Mrs. Valentine was first represented in 1hat action 
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by Samuel W. Stewart and Stewart, Cannon and Han-
son. Shortly before the matter was set for trial, on 
March 2, 1955, she employed Herbert B. Maw to repre-
sent her in that action and in Case No. 98754. Mr. Maw 
obtained a continuance of the trial of the Eliason suit 
until May 2, 1955 in order to familiarize himself with the 
facts of the case and filed an amended answer setting up 
a number of additional defenses. Pending the trial, con-
siderable negotiations were had between counsel for Mr. 
Eliason and Mr. Maw and James L. White, who held a 
power of attorney from Mrs. Valentine to discuss a 
settlement, but not to complete one, toward settlement 
of both cases. Counsel were unable to reach agreement 
and Case No. 101780 was tried before Judge Ray Van 
Cott, Jr., on May 2, and 3, 1955. Judgment for specific 
performance of the option was granted to Mr. Eliason. 
A few days later, Arnovitz filed the Petition in this case. 
No notice of filing of the petition or of the date of hear-
ing thereon was served upon Mr. Eliason or his counsel, 
although the proceeding was a patent attempt to defeat 
the Eliason judgment. Mr. Arnovitz also intervened in 
case No. 101780 to file a motion for a new trial. This 
motion was denied by Judge Van Cott without passing 
on the question of the right or power of :M:r. Arnovitz 
to intervene. No appeal has been taken in that action. 
As soon as counsel for Eliason discovered the exiSt-
ence of the Arnovitz petition, leave to intervene herein 
was asked and granted the day before the petition was 
to be heard. 
It will be readily seen that Eliason did not intervene 
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in this proceeding on behalf of 1frs. Valentine. He inter-
vened to protect against any collateral attack by this pro-
ceeding his interest in the 300,000 shares of stock in West-
ern States Refining Company obtained by reason of his 
judgment for specific performance of the option. This 
position of adverse interest has been frankly stated from 
the beginning by intervenor without any camouflage or 
protestations of innocence. 
B. The Issue 
The true issue before this court may best be stated 
by reference to the orders appealed from. 
The order of August 2, 1955 signed by Judge Baker 
reads in part as follows: 
"The alleged incompetent Florence S. Valen-
tine and the Intervenor have moved the court to 
dismiss the proceedings on the ground that the 
Petition and the facts stated in open court in sup-
port thereof by petitioner did not constitute 
grounds upon which a guardian should be ap-
pointed and good cause appearing therefor, 
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
and DECREED that the petition for appointment 
of a guardian of the property of Florence S. Val-
entine, be and it hereby is dismissed." (R. 40) 
1Ir. Arnovitz then filed a so-called Amendment to 
the Petition and this carne on for hearing before the 
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, who had also tried No. 
98754. Judge Jeppson's order reads in part as follows: 
"It appearing to the court that the petition 
of said Irwin Arnovitz had heretofore been dis-
missed under date of August 2, 1955, upon motion 
of the alleged incompetent and the intervenor that 
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the facts stated in the petition and the statement 
of Petitioner in open court as to what he proposed 
to prove did not constitute grounds upon which a 
guardian should be appointed, and it appearing to 
the court that the proposed amendment to the peti-
tion did not submit any additional facts which 
would constitute grounds upon which a guardian 
should be appointed, 
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
and DECREED, that the amended petition for 
the appointment of a guardian of Florence S. 
Valentine, be, and it hereby is dismissed." (R. 43) 
Thus, it is readily apparent that the rulings below 
were not alone based upon the allegations of the petition, 
but were based on the opening statement of J.Ir. Arno-
vitz at the hearing before Judge Baker as to what he 
proposed to prove. Therefore, the issue before this court 
is whether, assuming all the facts stated in the petition, 
and in Mr. Arnovitz' opening state1nent to be true, the 
trial court correctly non-suited l\Ir. Arnovitz. This, of 
course, is not what l\Ir. Arnovitz would like to have this 
court believe the issue is, as shown by his brief to this 
court and his failure in his designation of record (R. 
, 5~) to even mention the transcript of the hearing before 
.~ udge Baker. Again, if it had not been for intervenor 
naking an additional designation of the record, all the 
acts would not have c01ne before this court. 
Judge Baker in granting the n1otion to dismiss, acted 
1pon the facts in the allegations in the petition and those 
-facts stated in the opening statement of ~Ir. Arnovitz as 
!to what he proposed to prove. The transcript of the 
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hearing before Judge Baker bears this out. At page 10 
of the record, the trial court said: 
"The Court. You may proceed. 
"Mr. Arnovitz: The matter requires some 
little statement. I would like to make this outline 
to the court. * * *" 
Mr. Arnovitz then proceeded for some fourteen pages of 
transcript to outline the facts he would prove in his pro-
posed case. At page 26 of the transcript the court in-
quired: 
"The Court: Well, what do you intend to 
show regarding her incompetence~ 
"Mr. Arnovitz: We are going to show she is 
unable to alone carry out her business affairs 
which, under our statute, comes under the defini-
tion of incompetence." 
And then, on page 27, line 19, Mr. Arnovitz summed it 
up by saying: 
ord: 
"We intend to substantiate the facts as stat-
ed." 
Counsel for Eliason inquired at page 28 of the rec-
"Mr. Billings: What other evidence do y -
have other than stated this morning in your stat 
mentf' 
Mr. Arnovitz replied (R. 29): 
"Arnovitz: It would be this court woul':} hav 
the right to observe witnesses." 
In other words, all Arnovitz could ever gain by a hear. 
ing would be for the court to determine whether or not it 
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would believe the witnesses, assuming they would testify 
as he claimed. 
It is submitted nothing further could be gained from 
such an inquisition of Mrs. Valentine. The trial court, 
after hearing Mr. Arnovitz offer and detail his proof, 
stated (R. 29, lines 25-59) : 
"The court : Well, I doubt the sufficiency of 
these grounds, as stated, I doubt the sufficiency of 
any of these grounds to prove this woman is in-
competent. Is that the sole issue to be before this 
court~" 
Mr. Arnovitz again asked the court to hear the evidence 
as to whether he would prove what he said he was going 
to prove, but offered to prove no other facts than as 
theretofore stated in his opening statement. 
Counsel for Eliason had moved to dismiss at the 
conclusion of Mr. Arnovitz' opening statement on the 
ground that the facts as alleged in the petition and as 
stated in the opening statement did not constitute grounds 
in law for the appointment of a guardian of Mrs. Valen-
tine as an alleged incompetent (R. 26, line 7 and R-30, 
line 15) and that 1\fr. Arnovitz was not a proper party 
to file the petition. 1\Irs. Valentine then joined in this 
motion ( R. 35, lines 26-29). The court then took the mat-
ter under advisement and later granted the motion to dis-
miss on the grounds stated. (R. 40) 
It is in this posture then, that the orders dismissing 
the petition come before this court for review. 
There is only one issue : Do the facts as stated in the 
petition and in 1\fr. Arnovitz' opening statement, consti-
tute grounds showing it to be necessary that a guardian 
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should be appointed for the property of Mrs. Valentine 
on the basis that she is incompetent as defined in Section 
75-13-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ~ This issue can be 
resolved on the record before this court, without camou-
flage as to the true nature of the decision of the court 
below. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED WAS CORRECT. 
II. MRS. VALENTINE IS NOT INCOMPETENT AS DE-
FINED IN SEoCTION 75-13-20, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953. 
III. PETITIONER ARNOVITZ IS NOT A PROPER 
PARTY TO FILE THE SUBJECT PETITION. 
ARGUl\1ENT 
I. THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED WAS CORRECT. 
The procedure adopted by the trial court in dismiss-
ing the petition, after the opening statement of Mr. 
Arnovitz as to what he would seek to establish by the in-
competency of Mrs. Valentine and the necessity for a 
guardian, has long been recognized. See Bancroft "Code 
Practice and Remedies," § 524, and annotations at 83 
ALR 219 and 129 ALR 557. As stated by the Circuit 
Court of Appeals (C.A. 5, 1947) in Cutliff v. Comr. of 
Internal Revenue, 163 F. 2d 891: 
"The opening statements of counsel are not 
idle talk, but may afford the basis of deciding the 
case." 
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized 
that there is no question of the power of the trial court 
to direct a verdict for defendant or dismiss the proceed-
ings upon the opening statement of plaintiff's counsel 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
where that statement establishes that the plaintiff has no 
rights in the matter. As the court in Best v. Dep. of Com., 
291 U.S. 411,78 L. Ed. 882,885 said: 
"The power of the court to act upon the facts 
conceded by counsel is as plain as the power to 
act upon evidence produced." 
The comment of Mr. Justice Fie~d in one of the leading 
cases before the Supreme Court on such procedure, 
Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 103 U.S. 
261, 26 L. Ed. 539, 541, is particularly appropriate here: 
"Here there were no unguarded expressions 
used nor any ambiguous statements made. The 
opening counsel was fully apprised of all the facts 
out of which his client's claim originated and sel-
dom was a case opened with greater fullness of 
detail." 
Under our rules of civil procedure, it would appear 
to be proper under Rule 12 (c) and Rule 56. Firfer v.U.S., 
208 F. 2d 524 (C.A. D.C.1953). Under such circumstances, 
no findings of fact are required. See Rule 52 (a). The 
facts as stated by the petition and by ~Ir. Arnovitz in his 
opening statement are treated as proof and as though the 
evidence described had actually been introduced. Char-
pentier v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., (N.H. 1940) 13 A. 2d 
141 ; Anno : 83 ALR 226, 129 ALR 560. 
The cases cited by appellant in his brief stand for 
no different rule. In Re Lee's Guardianship, 267 P. 2d 847 
(Calif. 1954), the California court rule on the basis of 
"highly conflicting affidavits." Of course, under Rule 
56, a summary judgment would be in1proper when a con-
flict in material evidence exists. In the case of /11 Re 
10 
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Tilton's Estate and Guardianship, 114 P. 595, there had 
been a hearing and the appeal was from a failure to dis-
miss on the grounds that the petition was uncertain, 
stated merely conclusions, and on the ground of a claimed 
lack of jurisdiction. The California court merely held 
that there were sufficient facts alleged to give it juris-
diction and to make an inquiry necessary as to whether 
the guardian was competent. No other staternent was 
madeby the petitioner as to what he would prove as was 
in the case at bar. In the case of In Re Denny's Guardian-
ship, 218 P. 2d 792, the California trial court rejected 
the petition on the ground that a Nevada divorce was in-
valid and hence the court was without jurisdiction. On 
appeal it was held that the defendant could not assert 
the invalidity of the Nevada divorce as she was the one 
who had obtained the divorce and that therefore the court 
should have heard the evidence to determine whether it 
was necessary and proper to have a guardian appointed 
for the minor children of the parties. These cases pose 
a far different situation from the case at bar where the 
court ruled only after the petitioner had stated in detail 
all the evidence he was going to present as to the com-
petency of Mrs. Valentine. 
In the first Arnovitz case, I-I eath et al. v. Arnovitz, 
et al., 102 U. 1, 126 P. 2d 1058 (1942), the appellant had 
filed a special and general demurrer. This court ruled 
that the general statements in the petition in the language 
of the statute were sufficient to escape a general or spe-
cial demurrer. But here, the petition has gone further 
than merely alleging in general terms the language of 75-
11 
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13-20. Petitioner has detailed for some eight pages in his 
petition facts he claims establish Mrs. Valentine's incom-
petency and stated for some fourteen plus pages of trans-
script what he proposed to prove to the court in this re-
gard. All the lower court could have found by hearing the 
evidence would be questions as to the veracity of the 
witnesses or whether their story was as good as Mr. 
Arnovitz stated it would be. 
II. MRS. VALENTINE IS NOT INCOMPETENT AS DE-
FINED IN SE.CTION 75-13-20, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953. 
For the purposes of this argument, we will accept 
in general the allegations of fact made in the petition 
and in J\1:r. Arnovitz' opening statement as being estab-
lished, but to meet any innuendos that may arise from 
such acceptance in general we desire to make it clear 
that such allegations are only one party's myopic views of 
the actual facts. 
Section 75-13-19 provides for appointment of a 
guardian of the estate of an incompetent when it appears 
necessary upon a petition of a relative or friend. This 
appeal raises the question of whether on the facts estab-
lished by Mr. Arnovitz in his petition, and in his state-
ment to the court it is demonstrated that Mrs. Valentine 
is incmnpetent as defined in the Utah statute, and whether 
Petitioner Arnovitz may be classed as a "relative" or 
"friend." 
Section 75-13-20 defines incompetency as follows: 
"The words 'incompetent', 'mentally incompe-
tent' and 'incapable', as used in this title, shall 
be construed to mean any person who, though not 
12 
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insane, is, by reason of old age, disease, weakness 
of mind, or from any other cause, unable, un-
assisted, to properly manage and take care of him-
self or his property, and by reason thereof would 
be likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful 
or designing persons." · 
This court had before it the language of this section in 
Heath, et al. v. Arnovitz, et al., supra, which for compari-
son with the case at bar, might· be designated the first 
Arnovitz case. 
In that case, Mr. Arnovitz, appearing as attorney 
in fact for the daughters of the alleged incompetent, had 
filed a petition to have one Joseph A. Heath declared 
incompetent and a guardian appointed for his property 
on the same ground as in the case at bar, i.e., that he was 
likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or design-
ing persons. Referring to the statutory definition (Sec-
tion 75-13-20) this court said in that case: 
"The section implies physical or mental de-
fects which interfere with the rational functioning 
of the mind. If the mind functions rationally but 
the individual acts in a way commonly designated 
as eccentric-that is, his acts deviate from the 
usual principally because he is less susceptible to 
public opinion than are many of us-he is not in-
competent. One may love gardening--it was so 
testified of Mr. Heath-and not be interested in 
anything else even to the extent of losing his prop-
erty at the hands of unscrupulous friends or rela-
tives. He may be foolish in the eyes of many of 
us, but he is not incompetent. Competency is not 
measured by one's ability to accumulate and hold 
the material things of life. Were it so, there would 
be many of our ministerial brethren-not to men-
13 
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tion some of our learned judicial associates-be-
hind mental bars." 
In the first Arnovitz case, strong reliance was placed 
on the claim that Mr. Heath was not as astute a business-
man as Mr. Arnovitz would have desired, and had suffer-
ed losses by not understanding all the important parts of 
business transactions. Said the court of this contention: 
"Material loss in and of itself is a very dan-
gerous bit of evidence from which to reason back-
ward to a conclusion of incompetency. Such loss 
may be attributable to any number of causes such 
as indifference, laziness, lack of education, poor 
business judgment, dislike of a particular class of 
work or business-there are many possibilities. 
Thus, in passing upon the question of incompet-
ency we must determine if the evidence of loss is 
accompanied by evidence of physical or mental 
defect which interferes with the rational function-
ing of the mind. Undue influence arising from 
deep friendship for, or extreme confidence in 
others, alone, is not evidence of incompetency of 
the victim. It may be the instrumentality used 
upon an incompetent victim but there must be 
other evidence of that incompetence. Strong men-
talities are ofttimes the victims of undue influ-
ence." 
With these interpretations of the Ftah statute in 
mind, the appellant's version of the facts in the case at 
bar, which 1night well be designated the second Arnovitz 
case, should be considered. 
(a) 1\fr. Arnovitz c01nplains that he was dis-
charged after losing the \\-.-estern States Refining 
Company case and his client will not appeal. 
What an unfortunate situation our courts would be in, 
14 
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and to what level would public opinion of the bar sink if 
every time an attorney lost a case and was discharged by 
his client, he could have the client hauled in for inquisi-
tion as to his competency! 
(b) Mr. Arnovitz complains that Mrs. Valen-
tine would not appeal the Western States case and 
otherwise would not follow his advice. He states 
that she has also discharged other attorneys and 
now appears on her own behalf. 
To paraphrase the language of this court 1n the first 
Arnovitz case, "One r.aay dislike lawyers-and insist 
on representing himself, even to the extent of losing his 
property at the hands of unscrupulous friends or lawyers. 
He may be foolish in the eyes of others, particularly 
lawyers, but he is not incompetent." 
(c) Mr. Arnovitz complains Mrs. Valentine 
was unwilling to appeal the Western States Re-
fining case or to settle both the Western States 
and Eliason cases. 
The answer to that complaint may be found in this court's 
quotation frmn O'Reilly v. McLean, (1934) 84 Utah 551, 
at p. 557, 37 P. 2d 770, at 772, as follows: 
"Were the mental faculties so deficient or 
i1npaired that there was not sufficient power to 
comprehend the subject of the contract, its nature 
and its probable consequences, and to act ·with 
discretion in relation thereto, or with relation to 
the ordinary affairs of life f' 
and its comments thereon in the 1st Arnovitz case : 
"In other words, the evidence must show a 
lack of power to function-not an unwillingness 
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to or lack of interest in functioning, be the latter 
two ever so reprehensible as personal character-
istics." 126 P. 2d 1058, 1061. 
(d) Mr. Arnovitz points out that the judg-
ment which Mrs. Valentine declines to appeal af-
fects the interests of her children as well as her 
own. 
It may be that she is guilty of mismanagement or negli-
gence as their guardian, or as executrix of the estate of 
her late husband, on which grounds she could be removed 
under sections 75-13-9 or 75-6-1, as either guardian or 
executrix. But that is a far different thing than taking 
from her the control of her own property. The comments 
of this court in the first Arnovitz case quoted above make 
that point abundantly clear. 
As recognized by the California court in applying 
a similar statutory definition of incompetency: 
"Generally speaking, an adult person has a 
right to control his own person and affairs, and 
that right should not be taken from him, except 
upon a showing of the statutory grounds warrant-
ing a restriction of his liberty of action for his 
own protection." 
In re Watson, 168 P. 341, (Cal. 1917), Estate of 
Schulmeyer, 153 P. 233. 
(e) Mr. Arnovitz contends that Mrs. Valen-
tine, quite aside from the stock she received from 
her husband and contracted to sell to lvfr. Eliason, 
purchased after Mr. Valentine's death 70,000 
shares of Western States Refining Company stock 
at $2.00 per share and later sold some of it for 
only .50 per share. 
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If that is a basis for incompetency, there are numerous 
professional investors and stock brokers who are in dan-
ger of having a guardian appointed for their property, 
particularly, if they have ever had Mr. Arnovitz as their 
legal counsel. 
(f) Mr. Arnovitz complains about 1\Irs. Val-
entine's conduct of the litigation with Mr. Eliason. 
First of all, she did not decide to employ him. 
Then, he claims, she would not cooperate fully 
with Mr. 1\Iaw to enable him to prepare her case. 
From the records of that case, it is apparent that she 
furnished Mr. Maw sufficient information to enable him 
to prepare and file an amended answer. Her deposition 
was taken by plaintiff in that case and Mr. Maw was pres-
ent on that occasion. It is difficult to characterize that 
conduct as lack of cooperation. Mr. Arnovitz also points 
out that she failed to appear for cross examination after 
having spent half a day on the stand giving her direct 
testimony. He quite overlooks the possibility that her 
experience with courts and courtrooms in the Western 
States Refining Company case may have made the pros-
pects of a searching cross examination too rniserable 
to warrant further court appearance. To make the record 
clear, in the Eliason case, no one was trying to take away 
·her property for nothing. That action was to enforce a 
contract for the purchase and sale of 300,000 shares of 
stock at $1 per share, which the evidence in that case 
showed was above the current market price, both at the 
time the option _was given and at the time it was exer-
cised. 
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Then, of course, 1\fr. Arnovitz is troubled by the fact 
that Mrs. Valentine sent telegrams not only formally 
discharging Mr. Maw but even 1\fr. Arnovitz himself for 
the second time, because of his unasked for appearance 
at the trial as an "observor." One may characterize Mrs. 
Valentine's conduct with respect to her employment of 
counsel as eccentric, but as this court has stated, "that 
is not incompetency." Heath v. Arnovitz, supra. 
(g) Mr. Arnovitz mentions disharmony in 
the management of Western States Refining Com-
pany due to the activities of Mrs. Valentine. 
At her husband's death she succeeded him as chairman 
of the Board of Directors of that company. It is appar-
ent from the record in this case alone that Mrs. Valen-
tine is a very strong willed woman, yet with a woman's 
erratic and emotional tendencies, particularly, in busi-
ness affairs. The stockholders' suit which was eventually 
filed in 1953 as Case K o. 98754, was imminent at the time 
this disharmony existed. No wonder there was antago-
nism and disharmony among the board! She would have 
had to have the highest degree of administrative and 
executive skill to handle that situation. No one contends 
that Mrs. Valentine is a genius or even a good business-
wmnan, but that is no ground for the appoinbnent of a 
guardian to look after her affairs. In re WaiteS'' Guard-
ianship, 97 P. 2d 238 (Calif. 1939): In Re Baldridge, 266 
P. 2d 103, (Calif. 1954) Iu Re Delany, 226 S.\Y. 2d 366 
(Mo. 1950). 
Every businessn1an would be at the mercy of a "rela-
tive" or "friend" if this court would accept such a stand-
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ard for incompetency. I-Iistory is full of examples of in-
ventors who died impoverished because they were not 
good businessmen. The old adage about "shirt sleeves 
to shirt sleeves in three generations" would not have de-
veloped if all sons and grandsons were successful in hold-
ing on the property their forebears had accumulated. 
Our society has not established the paternalistic practice 
of having a court step in and appoint a guardian merely 
because the heirs were unsuccessful businessmen or 
profligate dissipators of their patrimony. 
(h) In his amendment to the petition (R. 
41) :Mr. Arnovitz complains that Mrs. Valentine 
relies on her own peculiar views of the law and 
has not delivered her stock to the clerk of the court 
or taken steps to collect the money deposited there 
by l\!Ir. Eliason to carry out the judgment he had 
obtained for specific performance. 
Peculiar or not, the record in Case No. 98754, which is 
before this court on ~1r. Arnovitz' pro se appeal, shows 
Western States Refining Company was unable to enforce 
its judgment which nfr. Arnovitz would like to appeal 
because :Mrs. Valentine refused to deliver over the stock 
certificates. Finally, the Refinery Company obtained a 
court order cancelling the shares held by ~frs. Valentine 
and ordering the secretary of the company to issue new 
certificates and deliver them to the clerk of the court 
to enforce the judgment. The judgment in the Western 
States Refinery case was then carried out against these 
new certificates and Mr. Eliason enforced a portion of his 
judgment for specific performance by redeeming 13n,OOO 
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shares from the lien imposed by the Western States' 
judgment. While technically the courts below have par-
tially enforced the judgments against 11rs. Valentine, 
she still has possession of all the stock. As a result, there 
are duplicate shares outstanding, at least to the extent of 
136,000 shares, and, as a consequence, the shares ac-
quired by Mr. Eliason are of questionable marketability 
despite his judgment. In effect, Mrs. Valentine has frus-
trated the processes of the law by her attitude which 
Mr. Arnovitz condemns as a sign of incompetency. While 
not commendable, her actions have secured the ends she 
has desired-the thwarting of the orderly processes of 
law in carrying out the judgments obtained against her. 
One would hesitate to declare that Andrew Jackson was 
incompetent, yet he was reported to have said: "John 
Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." 
III. PETITIONER ARNOVITZ IS NOT A PROPER 
PARTY TO FILE THE SUBJECT PETITION. 
Another question arises in this case which is also 
discussed in the first Arnovitz case. The statute (75-13-
19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) authorizes the filing 
of a petition for appointn1ent of a guardian for incom-
petency by a relative or a friend. :K eedless to say, !Ir. 
Arnovitz is not a relative, nor can he really be classified 
as a friend (In Re Oswald, (~.J. 1942) 28 A. 2d 399), 
despite the shining armor he has assumed throughout his 
brief. 
In the first Arnovitz case, ~Ir. Arnovitz satisfied 
this court that he ·was the attorney in fact for the children 
and his act as such in filing the petition was, in legal ef-
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
feet, their own and that therefore, the requirement of 
the statute so far as a relative was concerned, was satis-
fied. In the case at bar, the record indicates that Mrs. 
Valentine has plenty of relatives (R. 48a), two sisters and 
a brother, who could act if they felt it necessary. No 
such relative has seen fit to join in the petition of Mr. 
Arnovitz. In fact, both sisters, whose statements are not 
reported in the transcript, (R. 36) appeared in opposi-
tion to the appointment. The pleadings in the petition 
would indicate that l\1r. Arnovitz is relying on his posi-
tion as counsel for the minor children in the Western 
States Refining Company case to justify the filing of the 
petition here. It is true he wa.s the attorney for Florence 
S. Valentine, guardian of the estate of the then minor 
children. The record indicates (R. 44-45) that two of the 
·children are now of age, but he was not their attorney in 
fact, as was the situation in the first Arnovitz case. It is 
indeed a broad stretch of jurisdiction which would enable 
him, as attorney for them in the Western States Refining 
Company case, to persuade a court to allow him to draw 
an order directing him to file a petition for the appoint-
ment of a guardian for the estate of their mother. If 
there is any question about her competency to act as their 
guardian or as executrix, the proper procedure would 
have been to have taken the steps for her removal in 
those capacities. That having been done, the guardian 
of the minor children might be a proper person to file 
a petition with respect to the competency of the mother, 
but not the discharged and disgruntled attorney. 
It is difficult to see then, how the order of the judge 
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in the matter of the guardianship of the minor children 
(R. 48d, 48e) qualified Mr. Arnovitz as a relative under 
the statute to file the petition which is before this court. 
This leaves only the category "friend." It is true 
that the courts have determined that no particular degree 
of intimacy is required to consider the person the 
"friend" of the alleged incompetent. In Re Wagoner, 
151 Mich. 74, 114 N.W. 868, the court said: 
"Courts have usually regarded a friend as 
one who entertains regard for another, who takes 
active interest in his welfare, or is one favorably 
disposed toward a person." 
A friend has also been defined as one who : 
"* * * is seemingly upon harmonious terms 
with another." 
Grand v. Thompson, 174 Tenn. 278, 125 S.W. 2d 133. 
It would take a great deal of soul searching to come 
to the conclusion that the Petitioner-appellant in this 
case, meets those definitions. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the courts below correctly con-
cluded that the facts as stated in Mr. Arnovitz' petition 
and in his opening statement clearly show: 
(a) That Mrs. Valentine is not incompetent to man-
age her property. 
(b) That Mr. Arnovitz is not a proper party to file 
the subject petition. 
For these reasons judgment of the courts below dis-
missing these proceedings should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETER W. BILLINGS of 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, l\fOFFAT 
& MABEY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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